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INTRODUCTION 
I cannot say that I disagree with any of the analytical 
observations made by my co-contributors to this roundtable discussion 
of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.1 We all agree that the 
Supreme Court plans to use the case as an occasion to do something 
noteworthy to the constitutionality of affirmative action. And we all 
agree that the Court’s actions are likely to provide more comfort to 
opponents than to proponents of racial diversity. Our views diverge 
only with respect to doctrinal details about what the Court could or 
should do. But in translating the racial tensions that smolder beneath 
the concept of affirmative action into the more sanitized doctrinal 
issues that the Court has made relevant to its discussion of 
constitutionality, I fear that we may have lost sight of what is really 
at stake. At bottom, the affirmative action debate is about our 
 
   Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Lisa 
Heinzerling for her help in developing the ideas expressed in this article. Research for this 
article was supported by a grant from the Georgetown University Law Center. Copyright © 2012 
by Girardeau A. Spann. 
 1.  631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). The first round of 
contributions made to this roundtable discussion are Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best 
(Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases? Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) 
Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77 (2012); James F. Blumstein, Grutter 
and Fisher: A Reassessment and a Preview, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 57 (2012); Tomiko Brown-
Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational 
Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113 (2012); Girardeau A. Spann, Fisher v. Grutter, 65 VAND. 
L. REV. EN BANC 45 (2012); Gerald Torres, Fisher v. University of Texas: Living in the Dwindling 
Shadow of LBJ’s America, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97 (2012). 
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continuing cultural commitment to a long tradition of racial 
oppression. But by acquiescing in the Court’s effort to obscure that 
oppression with the patina of doctrine, we run the risk of offering 
analytical insights that may simply be beside the point. 
I. CONVERGENCE 
Given the contentious nature of the contemporary affirmative 
action debate, it is striking how much agreement there is among the 
contributors to this roundtable discussion of Fisher. We all agree that 
the Supreme Court seems motivated to use Fisher as a vehicle for 
cutting back on the availability of affirmative action, but before it can 
do so, James Blumstein and Vikram Amar remind us that it must first 
apply inconsistent justiciability precedents to deal with troublesome 
threshold issues relating to standing and mootness. Because the Court 
would probably not have granted certiorari unless it thought that the 
justiciability problems could be dealt with, the Court will likely use 
Fisher to make some modification to its Grutter v. Bollinger 
precedent.2 Although Grutter was the first case that squarely 
authorized the non-remedial use of race-conscious affirmative action 
to promote diversity in higher education, the diversity that Grutter 
envisioned was broader than mere race, and the beneficiaries of 
diversity included students of all races. Indeed, the white plaintiff 
Abigail Fisher did not dispute the University’s right to pursue student 
diversity.3 
We also seem to agree with Tomiko Brown-Nagin that the 
University of Texas has been innovative in addressing the current 
anti–affirmative action backlash through programs such as its Top 
Ten Percent plan; that the University’s race-conscious supplement to 
that plan addresses the Grutter narrow-tailoring requirement by 
giving race what can plausibly be termed the “infinitesimal” impact of 
reducing it to what the District Court called “a factor of a factor of a 
factor of a factor”; that invalidating the University’s consideration of 
race because it affects only a small number of students would create a 
Catch-22 problem; and that the University plan avoids the separate 
admission tracks condemned in Hopwood v. Texas.4 I think there is 
also little dispute that Latinos and blacks are caught in what Brown-
Nagin terms a “diversity paradox,” enabling those groups to increase 
 
 2.  See Amar, supra note 1, at 78–84; Blumstein, supra note 1, at 57–58 n.2. 
 3.  See Blumstein, supra note 1, at 60–62; Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 115, 120–21. 
 4.  78 F.3d 932, 936, 962 (5th Cir. 1996); see Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 115, 119–22, 
128. 
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their political and social power, but not to eliminate the economic and 
educational disparities that they suffer.5 
There does not seem to be any dispute about the success of the 
Texas Top Ten Percent plan in increasing university diversity, or 
about its failure to provide meaningful diversity in discussion-sized 
classes. Nor does there seem to be much dispute about the Gerald 
Torres and Brown-Nagin claim that expert educational and 
administrative strategies are needed to promote multiracial 
interactions by overcoming the self-segregation that commonly occurs 
on multicultural campuses in response to feelings of racial isolation.6 
Although Grutter authorized the use of race-conscious efforts to obtain 
a critical mass of minority students as part of a holistic admissions 
process, Grutter did not define critical mass. Nevertheless, critical 
mass cannot doctrinally reflect mere racial balance or racial 
engineering, but must instead encompass the quantitative and 
qualitative components needed to secure the pedagogical benefits of 
diversity. However, at least for the moment, the pursuit of critical 
mass does not require the University to exhaust all race-neutral 
alternatives.7 
Blumstein and Torres emphasize that race cannot alone be 
used as a proxy for diversity, but it can be used in the quest for those 
components of cognitive diversity that cannot be measured by 
standardized tests and class rank alone. And Blumstein stresses that 
Grutter’s non-remedial use of race to promote diversity can be viewed 
as authorizing the commodification of racial minorities for the 
educational benefit of admitted white students at the expense of 
lower-scoring white students who are not admitted.8 Although the Top 
Ten Percent plan arguably makes Fisher distinguishable from Grutter, 
it seems likely that the Fisher Supreme Court granted review in order 
to get what Torres terms a “do-over” for the diversity holding of 
Grutter—something that Blumstein views as fairly included in the 
Fisher “questions presented” for certiorari.9 
There also seems to be general agreement that Chief Justice 
Roberts, plus Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, will favor 
abandoning Grutter’s diversity rationale for the consideration of race 
in individual admission decisions, while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
 
 5.  See Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 115–17. 
 6.  See Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 122–23, 130–32; Torres, supra note 1, at 98–99, 101; 
cf. Blumstein, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
 7.  See Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 122–26; Torres, supra note 1, at 99–100, 104–05. 
 8.  See Blumstein, supra note 1, at 60, 65–67.  
 9.  See Blumstein, supra note 1, at 63, 76; Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 113–14; Torres, 
supra note 1, at 101. 
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Sotomayor, and Kagan (if she participates) are likely to favor 
reaffirming this aspect of Grutter. The decisive vote is likely to be cast 
by Justice Kennedy, who dissented from Grutter’s diversity holding, 
but whose Parents Involved opinion suggests that he will wish to 
invalidate the Fisher plan on non-deferential narrow-tailoring grounds 
relating to critical mass under the Top Ten Percent plan, rather than 
join an anti-educational-diversity opinion that closes the door on 
affirmative action completely in response to the threat of racial 
isolation. Leaving the door theoretically open will enable Justice 
Kennedy to remain the swing vote on the issue of affirmative action.10 
Finally, I suspect that we all agree with Amar’s suggestion that the 
Supreme Court’s affirmative action precedents are unclear, and that 
Justices on both sides of the issue have been more strategic than 
honest in formulating their arguments.11 
II. DIVERGENCE 
As I say, given the contentious nature of affirmative action, it 
is noteworthy that there is so much doctrinal agreement among us. 
But I think that is because our differences actually reside on a non-
doctrinal level. Even differences that might initially appear to be 
analytical disputes about the proper application of doctrine are more 
meaningfully viewed as disagreements about our underlying values 
concerning race. 
Doctrinally, Blumstein believes that the Supreme Court should 
use Fisher as an opportunity to reconsider and reverse Grutter’s 
holding that educational diversity is a compelling governmental 
interest for strict scrutiny purposes.12 However, Torres and Brown-
Nagin believe that Grutter’s diversity holding need not be 
reconsidered, and if revisited, should be reaffirmed.13 
Blumstein also believes that Grutter’s narrow-tailoring 
requirement cannot be satisfied in Fisher because the educational 
benefits of student body diversity can be achieved without the 
consideration of racial diversity. And given the diversity already 
produced by the Top Ten Percent plan, even if the consideration of 
racial diversity were required, any marginal increase in diversity 
attributable to race-conscious admissions could not be characterized 
as narrowly tailored. Moreover, because there is no evidence that race 
 
 10.  See Amar, supra note 1, at 85–90; Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 117, 138. 
 11.  See Amar, supra note 1, at 78, 91–96. 
 12.  See Blumstein, supra note 1, at 60, 63–72. 
 13.  See Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 117–19; Torres, supra note 1, at 101–02, 111–12. 
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consciousness will in fact produce a critical mass of minority students 
sufficient to ensure classroom diversity, traditional strict scrutiny 
analysis precludes deference to the University in making the narrow-
tailoring determination.14 
Torres and Brown-Nagin believe that because racial diversity 
is an essential component of student diversity, Grutter’s narrow-
tailoring requirement is satisfied by deference to the University’s 
educational and administrative expertise concerning the admissions 
strategies that are most likely to produce the critical mass of minority 
students needed for meaningful minority participation in discussion-
sized classes. Both also emphasize the existence of First Amendment 
academic freedom dimensions to applicants and to the University’s 
ability to pursue its educational mission. In addition, both emphasize 
the need to read the Fourteenth Amendment in light of in-the-
trenches knowledge and real world effects.15 
Concepts like strict scrutiny, compelling interest, narrow 
tailoring, and critical mass have contestable content that is as 
imprecise as the underlying concept of equal protection itself. Because 
the meaning that we attribute to such concepts tends to correspond to 
the underlying values that we enlist those concepts to serve, it seems 
artificial to suggest that our disagreements about the constitutionality 
of affirmative action are disagreements about doctrine. Rather, they 
are disagreements about the very values that motivate our doctrinal 
manipulations to begin with. As Torres observed, whether the 
Supreme Court has chosen the correct path in its approach to 
affirmative action “will not be answered, however, by arguing over 
doctrine. It will be answered by what actually happens in the world.”16 
The doctrinal debate about affirmative action is but a proxy for the 
underlying cultural debate that we are having about the desirability of 
distancing ourselves from our long history of racial oppression. 
Therefore, we should not lightly acquiesce in any Supreme Court 
effort to use doctrine to distract us from what is at stake. 
III. OPPRESSION 
Amar, who stresses the importance of candor in assessing the 
constitutionality of affirmative action, notes that the Supreme Court 
is most amenable to race consciousness when the influence of race is 
 
 14.  See Blumstein, supra note 1, at 67–76. 
 15.  See Brown-Nagin, supra note 1, at 117–18, 132–38; Torres, supra note 1, at 105–11. 
 16.  See Torres, supra note 1, at 111. 
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most successfully camouflaged or concealed.17 I believe that this is 
because the social function of the Supreme Court has always been to 
legitimate racial oppression by hiding it within the interstices of 
doctrine.18 And all of the Court’s race-neutral talk is simply a way of 
pretending that race does not matter. 
We are a culture that has long been committed to the concept 
of racial oppression. From the genocide of indigenous Indians; to the 
invention of chattel slavery; to the Jim Crow perfection of peonage, 
convict labor, and segregation; to the internment of Japanese 
American citizens; to the “New Jim Crow” of mass incarceration; we 
have always been very good at what we do.19 And every step of the 
way, the Supreme Court has been there to generate constitutional 
doctrine explaining why our oppressive practices did not offend our 
equality ideals. In contemporary culture, the affirmative action debate 
has simply come to embody our collective ambivalence about 
relinquishing our commitment to that tradition. 
Although everyone seems to agree that the affirmative action 
debate is about racial oppression, proponents and opponents disagree 
about which race is being oppressed and which is doing the 
oppressing. But once one takes a step back from the Supreme Court’s 
doctrinal overlay, it is difficult to view that as a seriously contested 
issue. If you asked a detached observer from Mars whether whites 
were oppressing minorities or minorities were oppressing whites, the 
past, present, and likely future distribution of economic, political, and 
social resources would make the answer seem pretty clear. 
Nevertheless, the primary function of the Supreme Court’s affirmative 
action doctrine continues to be largely about obscuring that rather 
obvious truth. 
My fear is that by getting us to sit here debating doctrine while 
the culture renews its commitment to the oppression of racial 
minorities, the Supreme Court will have already won. Proponents of 
racial justice will have been seduced into domesticating their moral 
outrage into a polite form of sanitized constitutional argument. 
Indeed, that is why I think the Court is unlikely to overrule Grutter 
and close the door on affirmative action completely. It would make the 
culture’s commitment to racial oppression too obvious for the culture 
to feel good about itself in reaffirming that commitment. And—if the 
 
 17.  See Amar, supra note 1, at 90–91, 96. 
 18.  See, e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT & 
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993). 
 19.  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 20–57 (2010). 
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Supreme Court is unwilling to uphold the affirmative action plan in 
Fisher—that is why I would prefer for the Supreme Court to close the 
door on affirmative action completely, rather than leave open a 
legitimating crack. I have more faith in ordinary politics than in the 
diversionary constitutional politics of the Court. 
I anticipate the objection that at least some affirmative action 
is better than none. But as a black person who is tired of feeling 
vulnerable to the largess of a white Supreme Court that gives us the 
equality of Dred Scott, Plessy, Korematsu, and perhaps Fisher, I 
balance the competing interests differently. I would rather have the 
Court stop explaining to me why it is constitutionally obligated to 
sacrifice my interests in the name of equality. Continued racial 
oppression is the issue. And, as they say, the rest is noise. 
CONCLUSION 
I claim that the current affirmative action backlash is just the 
latest in a long line of legal maneuvers designed to make our 
compulsive cultural addiction to racial oppression appear morally 
acceptable. Then—as if to prove my point—the Supreme Court’s 
response is to talk about things like strict scrutiny, compelling 
interests, narrow tailoring, and critical mass. It is hard to know what 
to do next. Other than emit a despondent sigh. Yeah. Right. 
Whatever. 
 
